I believe that this decision has contributed greatly to the work of the Committee of the Twenty. The exchange rate system and foreign exchange reserves and the money used are two of the most fundamental elements of an international monetary system and are closely linked. An outcome that has completely blown up the exchange rate regime could therefore hardly be seen as a comprehensive monetary reform. Moreover, such efficiency, as it exists in our current institution, will probably be undermined by a significant tendency in recent years to politicize monetary problems. Political influence can be a very positive factor. Mr. Lieftinck said that during his tenure as Dutch Finance Minister, whenever negotiations on the creation of the Benelux were seriously stalled, he insisted on the presence of foreign ministers, as they constitute the political will to succeed. But the current tendency to politicize monetary issues sometimes seems to be aimed at overcoming serious political differences on monetary problems. I believe that this will only delay agreement on rational solutions and that solutions must be rational to achieve positive results in practice. The development of practical solutions is therefore very different from adopting comprehensive resolutions and setting unattainable objectives, although they have their own role and importance in addressing pressing issues. The amendment of the IMF agreement and the increase in IMF quotas require congressional approval.
After a final technical review by the IMF Executive Committee, the entire package is expected to be submitted to Congress in mid-April. Although some Members have expressed some concerns about certain aspects of the gold agreement, I expect Congresses to support the package as a whole. We have kept Congress informed during the negotiation of the agreement and will work closely with key members and committees to prepare for the formal presentation of the legislation. Below, I propose to deal successively (1) with the tensions that have developed within the Bretton Woods system and why it was broken; (2) the reform efforts that followed and why they failed; (3) the Jamaican agreement and its importance; (4) Where and how we are going. There was a consensus that the financial problems of developing countries remain serious, albeit less difficult in 1976 than in 1975. There was broad consensus that the implementation of the trust fund and expanded access to IMF funds are important measures to help developing countries, as agreed in the interim committee. As we have not yet received funding for the first of four annual contributions to the fourth re-enactment of the International Development Association, we have not been able to accept the positive statements regarding IDA-Five`s contributions, on which negotiations have begun. The 1972 Report of the Executive Directors on the Reform of the International Monetary System had already addressed one of the problems with the suspension of the convertibility of the dollar into gold, namely the huge dollars that had accumulated a number of countries in efforts to defend the old values of parity, but which were made impossible by the non-convertibility of the dollar. In the event that, in April 1968, after at least five years of discussion, study, debate and negotiation, a final agreement on the SDR regime within the Fund was reached.
The agreement entered into force on 28 July 1969 after the conditions for ratification of the Amendments to the Fund`s statutes by members had been met. In the first place, time was running out. Faced with the need to reach a comprehensive agreement between sovereign governments, it took five years for the simplest issue, namely the creation of an internationally managed reserve, to be completed.